Govern what your agents do.Not just what they click.
One accountable path for every outbound call your applications, AI agents, MCP servers and your own people make. Deny by default, tokenize what leaves, and put the real end user in the loop on anything that matters.
Approval required
An agent wants to move money
- Requested by
- invoice-agent
- Action
- Refund a payment
- Destination
- api.stripe.com
- Amount
- $2,480.00
- Customer
- j••••@northwind.cotokenized
- Card
- 4000 00•• •••• 1782tokenized
ed25519:9f3a…c71d · bound to this action
Example approval
Your egress model was built for people, not agents.
Egress control assumed a human clicking a browser. Software now initiates outbound traffic across three fronts at once, each owned by a different team, or by no one. An agent acts with real credentials, at machine speed, with no one watching.
- Web
- A traditional proxy sees a hostname at best, never the full URL, the payload, or the intent behind the call.
- LLM
- Every model call can carry PII, secrets, or your crown-jewel prompts to a third party.
- Agent · MCP / A2A
- Tool calls execute real actions: move money, change records, send messages.
Three fronts. One thing in common: nothing is watching what your software sends out.
One governed doorwayfor everything that leaves.
Approval required
An agent wants to move money
- Requested by
- invoice-agent
- Action
- Refund a payment
- Destination
- api.stripe.com
- Amount
- $2,480.00
- Customer
- j••••@northwind.cotokenized
- Card
- 4000 00•• •••• 1782tokenized
ed25519:9f3a…c71d · bound to this action
Example approval
The person who owns the data is the person who approves.
Push-MFA proves who you are, then asks one of a few operators to approve a login. Squidder asks the actual data subject to approve the actual action, reconstructed from what the agent really tried to do.
What you see is what you execute
The card is built from the intercepted action and cryptographically bound to it, so an untrusted agent cannot show a human one thing and run another.
The credential never touches your infrastructure
Their own phone makes the outbound call from a hardware-backed vault. The gateway only ever sees the signed result.
Approval required
An agent wants to move money
- Requested by
- invoice-agent
- Action
- Refund a payment
- Destination
- api.stripe.com
- Amount
- $2,480.00
- Customer
- j••••@northwind.cotokenized
- Card
- 4000 00•• •••• 1782tokenized
ed25519:9f3a…c71d · bound to this action
Example approval
The whole control plane, in one console.
One policy language across web, LLM and agent traffic, with the audit and the cost model built from the same records.
Deny-by-default egress
Nothing leaves until you allow it. A layered app, group and tenant policy resolves every destination to automated, user-approved, or denied.
User-in-the-loop approval
When a call needs its owner, the gateway asks the real end user. A push shows a plain-language summary of the actual data flow.
Delegated execution
Invoke third-party APIs on a user's behalf without the gateway ever holding their credential. An on-device vault runs the call.
Reversible tokenization
Format-preserving synthetic values leave the boundary; real values are restored on the way back, even across streamed replies.
Usage + cost observability
Per-app, per-group, per-model dashboards over tokens, latency and spend, built from the same records that drive policy.
Hash-chained audit
A tamper-evident record of every decision and outbound call, never the secret, with chain-integrity verification on export.
The chokepoint that governs your AI also shows you what it costs.
Because every model call already flows through one identity-attributed doorway, usage and cost are not a bolt-on tool with its own SDK and its own blind spots. The same plane that decides what is allowed also measures every token and caps it before it runs away.
Spend this month
$10,700
68% of a $15,000 cap
Attributed to a team
100%
no unallocated spend
Cheapest passing model
−31%
graded on live traffic
Spend by team, this month
Rolled up from the same records that enforce policy. Total $10,700.
- Support automation$4,8201.2M
- Sales research$3,140840K
- Doc pipeline$1,960410K
- Internal copilot$780190K
Illustrative figures
Every other tool solves a slice.We govern the whole doorway.
LLM gateways
LiteLLM, Portkey, Kong AI, OSS Bifrost
Route model calls, manage keys and budgets, add basic guardrails. One surface.
Agent-action governance, user-in-the-loop approval, and delegated execution, plus usage and cost attribution, across web, LLM, and MCP as one plane.
AI firewalls
Lakera, Cloudflare AI Gateway
Filter content by shipping your raw text to a hosted classifier to read.
Tokenize-before-dispatch, so raw values never leave the boundary, and a full egress control plane, not just a filter.
Cloud AI guardrails
Bedrock Guardrails, Azure Content Safety, Model Armor
Provider-native safety, locked to one vendor. No egress, approval, or audit layer.
Provider-agnostic across 20+ providers, plus the egress, approval, and audit layers. It can even use these as building blocks.
LLM observability
Langfuse, Helicone, Datadog LLM Observability
Watch and chart what already happened, over the LLM surface only. Read-only, and blind to any call that skipped the SDK.
The plane that measures is the plane that enforces, so a budget is a ceiling and not a chart. Web, LLM, and MCP in one ledger.
Push-MFA / HITL
Duo, Okta Verify
Prove who you are, or put a human in the loop by asking one of a few operators to approve a login. Identity, not action.
User in the loop, not just human in the loop: the actual data subject sees and approves the real reconstructed action, executed from their own device.
Build it yourself
Open-source base + plugins
SSO, guardrails, immutable audit, RBAC, and MCP governance are a multi-quarter internal build.
The whole superset, already built, integrated, and shipping, from day one.
Don't trust the agent. Verify everything.
Secretless by design
The user's credential and the outbound call stay on their device.
Nothing raw leaves
Tokenization runs before dispatch, as a hard gate, so no raw PII crosses the inspection boundary.
Fail closed, always
A stale identity mirror returns 503, distinct from a 403 deny, and a classifier failure stops.
Put every outbound call on one accountable path.Start with a demo.
See Squidder govern a live agent end to end: capture a token, tokenize sensitive data, and route a real action to a phone for approval, in minutes.